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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008

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TOR: 261011Z OCT 89

1. C/O [] MET WITH [] (P/1) ON 24 OCT 89 AT S/H PAUL, NO SECURITY OR CI INCIDENTS OCCURRED DURING THE MEETING. NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 5 NOV, AT S/H PAUL.

2. DURING THIS MEETING, MAJOR TOPICS OF CONVERSATION WERE P/1'S INTEREST IN C/O PROVIDING FEED INFORMATION FOR P/1 TO GIVE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU (LPB) CHIEF AHMAD ABDIL NABBI AL-((SHAHATI)) AND P/1'S DESIRE TO HAVE A FINAL INSTANCE OF MOCK SURGERY CONDUCTED ON HIS ARM. RE THE FORMER, REGARDLESS OF ANY EFFORTS P/1 WAS MAKING TO INGRATIATE HIMSELF WITH THE LPB CHIEF, [] HAD DECIDED TO TELL P/1 THAT "WASHINGTON" HAD VETOED PASSAGE OF SIGNIFICANT/SENSATIONAL INFO (WHETHER TRUE OR FALSE) BECAUSE OF SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. AS BEFORE, ANY FEED INFO FOR THE LPB CHIEF WOULD BE BASED SOLELY ON "RUMINT" ITEMS STATION OR P/1 COULD PRODUCE FROM LOCAL PRESS OR GOSSIP. P/1 CLAIMED THAT BECAUSE OF HIS NON-STATUS IN MALTA, HE WAS OUT-OF-THE-LOOP FROM ACQUIRING EVEN "RUMINT." HE ADDED THAT IF AL-SHAHATI DOES GIVE HIM A POSITION AS HIS AIDE, HE WOULD AGAIN BEGIN DEVELOPING SOURCES IN MALTA TO PROVIDE INFO FOR THE LPB CHIEF'S CONSUMPTION. UNDER THESE GUIDELINES, C/O AND P/1 THEN DISCUSSED SOME NEWSPAPER ITEMS FOR USE WITH AL-SHAHATI.

3. P/1 ALSO RAISED HIS INTENTION TO HAVE A FINAL ROUND OF SURGERY CONDUCTED ON HIS ARM AND ASKED IF C/O WOULD BE ABLE TO HELP FINANCIALLY. P/1 EXPLAINED THAT PEOPLE IN LIBYA WHO WANT TO STAY OUT OF THE MILITARY OFTEN PAY UPWARDS OF 50,000 LIBYAN DINAR FOR SIMILAR TYPES OF OPERATIONS. HE READILY ADMITTED THAT [] HAD ALREADY ASSISTED WITH 3,000 LM (APPROXIMATELY 9,000 USD) TO DATE, BUT STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING A "FRESH AND CONVINCING" WOUND FOR SHOCK VALUE WITH THE MILITARY MEDICAL REVIEW BOARD.

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BECAUSE P/1'S PERMISSION FROM LOCAL ESO OFFICERS TO REMAIN IN MALTA IS DRAWING TO AN END, P/1 MUST LEAVE MALTA WITHIN ONE MONTH TO FACE THE BOARD. THE ONLY EXCEPTION WOULD BE AL-SHAHATI'S INTERVENTION TO KEEP P/1 IN MALTA AS AN AIDE.

4. AFTER HEARING OUT P/1'S REQUESTS, C/O RAISED IN STRONG TERMS THAT "WASHINGTON" WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY IMPATIENT WITH P/1'S DEMANDING NATURE. DURING HIS LATEST TRIP TO MALTA, P/1 HAD FAILED AS YET TO SECURE A PERMANENT POSITION IN EITHER LIBYA OR MALTA AND WAS IN NO POSITION TO INSIST ON UNQUALIFIED ASSISTANCE FROM [] EITHER FOR REAL INTELLIGENCE FOR AL-SHAHATI OR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR HIS MOCK SURGERY. ONLY IF "WASHINGTON" BELIEVED P/1 WAS STILL COOPERATING WOULD ANY ASSISTANCE BE FORTHCOMING. P/1 WAS VISIBLY NONPLUSSED BY THE NATURE AND FORCE OF C/O'S REPRESENTATION AND FOR THE FIRST TIME SHOWED CONCERN FOR THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF SUPPORT HE RECEIVES FROM []. C/O ALSO NOTED THAT P/1'S ENGLISH IMPROVED AS HE MADE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO ASSURE C/O OF HIS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT TASKING AND CONTROL IN THE RELATIONSHIP. C/O SUBSEQUENTLY OFFERED TO CHECK WITH "WASHINGTON" RE HIS REQUESTS, BUT MADE NO PROMISES.

5. BASED ON P/1'S NEAR-TERM RESOLUTION OF HIS STATUS IN EITHER MALTA OR LIBYA, [] RECOMMENDS THAT WE PROVIDE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN THE SUM OF 500 LM (1500 USD) FOR THIS FINAL PIECE OF SURGERY FOR P/1. WE HAVE THUS FAR INVESTED HIGHLY IN P/1 AND TO ABANDON HIM AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE AT RELATIVELY LITTLE EXTRA COST WOULD ONLY APPEAR AS DIMINISHED COMMITMENT TO HIM AND ULTIMATELY ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR CONTROL OVER HIM AS WELL. WE BELIEVE C/O'S LECTURE TO P/1 ON WASHINGTON'S UNHAPPINESS WITH HIS NON-STATUS HAD THE INTENDED EFFECT OF ALERTING P/1 THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP IS NOT FOREVER. REQUEST HQS AND [] CONCURRENCE. C/O REPEATED OUR DESIRE TO HAVE P/1 ACCEPT A POSITION AT THE REVCOM OPS CENTER AND, ONLY AS A SECOND OPTION, WORK AS AL-SHAHATI'S AIDE; P/1 UNDERSTOOD. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

6. P/1 DID NOT SHOW FOR 25 OCT MEETING. C/O WILL MEET HIM NEXT ON 5 NOV AFTER HIS RETURN FROM TDY OUTSIDE MALTA.

END OF MESSAGE

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